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A B S T R A C T   
Market-like mechanisms for biodiversity offsetting have emerged globally as supposedly cost-effective ap-
proaches for mitigating the impacts of development. In reality, offset buyers have commonly found that required 
credits are scarce and/or expensive. One response has been to seek improved market functionality, increasing 
eligible offset supply by allowing greater flexibility in the offset trading rules. These include increasing the size of 
geographical trading areas and expanding out-of-kind trades (‘geographical’ and ‘ecological’ flexibility). We 
summarise the arguments for and against flexibility, ultimately arguing that increasing flexibility undermines the 
achievement of No Net Loss (or Net Gain) of biodiversity where high-quality governance is lacking. We argue 
expanding out-of-kind trading often increases the pool of potentially eligible offsets with limited conservation 
justification. This interferes with vital information regarding the scarcity of the impacted biodiversity feature, 
thereby disincentivising impact avoidance. When a biodiversity feature under threat of development is scarce, 
expensive offsets are an essential feature of the economics of offsetting which communicate that scarcity, not a 
problem to be regulated away. We present examples where increasing ecological flexibility may be justifying the 
loss of conservation priorities. We also discuss how increasing geographical flexibility might compromise the 
additionality principle. We highlight alternative mechanisms for enhancing offset supply without the risks 
associated with increasing flexibility, including reducing policy uncertainty and improving engagement and 
awareness to increase landholder participation. Although there are legitimate reasons for increasing offsetting 
flexibility in some specific contexts, we argue that the biodiversity risks are considerable, and potentially un-
dermine ‘no net loss’ outcomes.   
1. Biodiversity offsetting regulatory markets 
Biodiversity offsets are a globally significant mechanism for recon-
ciling potential trade-offs between biodiversity and infrastructure 
expansion or other development projects (Bull and Strange, 2018; 
Shumway et al., 2018; zu Ermgassen et al., 2019a). Offsets are conser-
vation actions taken to compensate fully for the residual biodiversity 
losses associated with development following the application of a 
mitigation hierarchy (e.g. avoid, minimise, remediate, offset), with the 
overall aim of achieving No Net Loss (NNL) or Net Gain of biodiversity 
(Bull et al., 2013a; Gardner et al., 2013). Within several jurisdictions 
around the world, offsets are supplied to proponents undertaking 
development or land clearing through regulatory markets or market-like 
mechanisms. These are systems characterised by market-like trades 
between buyers and sellers but are not ‘free markets’ for various tech-
nical reasons, including the buyers being coerced into purchasing 
through government regulations rather than transactions being volun-
tary (Koh et al., 2019; Vatn, 2015). Over 81,000km2 of offsets globally 
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are currently implemented as a result of national biodiversity compen-
sation policies (Bull and Strange, 2018). 
The ultimate purposes of biodiversity offset regulatory markets are to 
internalise the value of biodiversity into the land-use planning process 
and deliver biodiversity gains that fully compensate for losses induced 
by development activities, in a cost-effective way (Calvet et al., 2015). 
Commonly, a government regulator sets an overall target outcome (e.g. 
‘NNL in native vegetation’) and facilitates the establishment of trade 
infrastructure that connects landholders providing offsets with potential 
buyers, often with the help of brokers (Koh et al., 2019; Vatn, 2015). If 
the market-like mechanism functions effectively, in theory, landholders 
will compete to deliver the required biodiversity gains at the lowest 
price – which ultimately allocates the task of biodiversity conservation 
to the landholder who is able to deliver the required biodiversity most 
efficiently (Calvet et al., 2015). This relies on the strong and contestable 
assumption that the landholder does in reality meet their biodiversity 
obligation (Theis et al., 2020; zu Ermgassen et al., 2019b). 
Regulators largely determine the biodiversity outcomes of regulatory 
offset markets, as they specify the requirements that trades must achieve 
in order to be compliant. Best practice guidance for voluntary offsets (e. 
g. BBOP, 2013; IUCN, 2016) suggests that biodiversity trades should be 
‘like-for-like’ or better (i.e. gains or avoided losses should benefit the 
same biodiversity feature as was impacted, or a biodiversity feature that 
is more threatened), and should usually occur within the same 
geographical region. The rationale behind these conventional trading 
constraints is to maintain the functioning of the impacted ecosystem, 
and to ensure that the same community of people that loses out on a 
valuable biodiversity feature maintains access to an equivalent biodi-
versity feature (Bull et al., 2013a; Griffiths et al., 2019). 
Whilst the explicit purpose of many biodiversity offsetting regulatory 
markets is to achieve NNL of biodiversity, in order to achieve buy-in 
from regulated industries, in practice offsetting policies are outcomes 
of negotiation processes among multiple stakeholders (Miller et al., 
2015). As a result, offset policies often compromise on ecological theory 
in order to satisfy other economic or industry objectives (Calvet et al., 
2015). This is risky as there is currently limited information on the 
actual effectiveness of offsetting schemes at delivering appropriate 
biodiversity gains (Gibbons et al., 2018; zu Ermgassen et al., 2019b). 
Ways in which economic/cost-reduction priorities interfere with the 
capacity of offsets to achieve no net loss in biodiversity include situa-
tions where policies: a) specify pre-set, often arbitrary multipliers (the 
ratio of biodiversity gains to losses required by the policy) that are lower 
than those required to truly achieve NNL (Bull et al., 2017; Laitila et al., 
2014); b) systematically overestimate the counterfactual rates of habitat 
loss to make offset obligations easier to achieve through ‘avoided loss’ 
(offsetting where habitat loss is traded for an increase in the level of 
protection of existing habitat; Maron et al., 2015); and c) use stream-
lined and simplified biodiversity assessment methods to reduce trans-
action burden on developers (Lave et al., 2010; Sullivan and Hannis, 
2015). There are many mechanisms through which economic consid-
erations can be prioritised over biodiversity. These include pressure 
from vested interests, and situations where time-stressed under- 
resourced regulators are implicitly incentivised to rush through ap-
provals without full scrutiny, or deliver outcomes supporting over-
arching government pro-development priorities over environmental 
ones (Clare and Krogman, 2013; Jacob and Dupras, 2020; Macintosh 
and Waugh, 2014). 
This paper explores one aspect of offset trades that has so far received 
relatively little attention in the literature: offsetting flexibility (Bull 
et al., 2015; Habib et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2018). There are three main 
categories of flexibility in biodiversity offsetting: ecological, geograph-
ical, and temporal (Table 1, see Bull et al. (2015) for additional cate-
gories not addressed here). Here, we focus on the implications of 
ecological and geographical flexibility, as the impact of temporal flexi-
bility (i.e. allowing impacts today to be compensated for through 
promised biodiversity gains delivered in the future) has been widely 
discussed and established (Bekessy et al., 2010; Bull et al., 2015; 
Buschke and Brownlie, 2020; Weissgerber et al., 2019; Yu et al., 2018). 
There is widespread agreement that biodiversity gains achieved in 
advance of the biodiversity loss associated with development are more 
likely to deliver NNL and entail better biodiversity outcomes compared 
to those promised in the future through restoration actions planned over 
long time horizons. 
Regulators set the degrees of flexibility permitted by the policy. 
Recent evidence (outlined below) suggests that several established offset 
systems have permitted increasing ecological and/or geographical 
flexibility over time, consistent with non-ecological objectives such as 
improving the function of offsetting market-like mechanisms through 
increasing the ease of trades (Needham et al., 2019). In early-stage offset 
Table 1 
Summary of the three main categories of flexibility in biodiversity offset trades.  
Category of flexibility Explanation 
Ecological (also referred to as ‘ecological 
equivalence’) 
Biodiversity offset policies have rules 
that determine which type of 
biodiversity is considered an acceptable 
replacement for lost biodiversity. Best 
practice guidelines promote ‘like-for-like 
or better’ trading rules (BBOP, 2013;  
IUCN, 2016), whereby lost biodiversity 
needs to be replaced by the same kind of 
biodiversity or one that is more 
ecologically valuable or threatened. As 
flexibility increases along this 
dimension, the ecological communities 
or species targeted by the offset actions 
can be increasingly different from those 
impacted by a development activity. 
Geographical/spatial Offset policies normally implement some 
constraints about where offsets need to 
be located relative to the impact causing 
the biodiversity loss. It is widely 
advocated that offsets should be located 
as close as possible to the initial impact 
site, so that people in the vicinity retain 
their access to nature and to improve the 
chance of ecological equivalence at 
levels below that of the categorical 
‘types’ of biodiversity (e.g. populations, 
genes). Commonly, offset policies 
mandate that trades need to occur within 
the same administrative unit as the 
impacts (e.g. Biodiversity Net Gain in 
England is proposing to penalise trades 
which do not occur within the same local 
authority (Crosher et al., 2019)), or 
within the same defined ecological unit 
(e.g. compensatory wetland mitigation in 
the US under the Clean Water Act must 
occur within the same watershed). As 
geographical flexibility increases, offset 
sites can be further from the impact sites. 
Temporal (offsets established in advance 
of biodiversity impacts are often 
called ‘habitat banks’) 
Offset policies can specify how far in the 
future biodiversity gains need to be 
delivered in order to be considered 
acceptable to compensate for losses 
today. Some offset policies allow for 
offsets to deliver gains long into the 
future (e.g. in the proposed Biodiversity 
Net Gain policy in the UK, gains can be 
delivered up to 32 years into the future 
and count towards acquitting a 
developers’ offset liability (Crosher et al., 
2019)), others have constructed systems 
of habitat banking that ensure that a 
large proportion of the biodiversity gains 
are in place before the development 
impact occurs (e.g. wetland mitigation 
banking in the US). As temporal 
flexibility increases, biodiversity gains 
can be delivered further into the future.  
S.O.S.E. zu Ermgassen et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Biological Conservation 252 (2020) 108861
3
systems where the regulatory architecture is still under development, 
such as the UK’s Net Gain policy for development activities in England 
(Defra, 2019), questions surrounding flexibility are fundamental as, 
once embedded, they determine the future functioning of the policy. 
2. The arguments for increasing offsetting flexibility 
Offset regulatory markets are in general perceived to be inefficient 
because they are often characterised by low offset supply, high trans-
action costs (i.e. costs associated with measurement of the value of a 
trade, search for information, bargaining and decision-making (Cheung, 
2016)) and a low volume of trades for a given credit type (Needham 
et al., 2019). Some of these transaction costs are essential. Organising 
offsets (e.g. conducting biodiversity assessments, encouraging land-
holder participation, monitoring compliance) is time consuming and 
contractually challenging (Evans, 2017; Vaissière et al., 2018); problems 
which ultimately contributed to the UK’s biodiversity offsetting pilot 
(2012–2014) failing to secure any trades (Needham et al., 2019). These 
transaction costs can impose additional costs on offset purchasers 
looking to construct new infrastructure or developments (Buitelaar, 
2004). 
Recent work has outlined that biodiversity offset market-like 
mechanisms are likely to function most effectively from an economic 
perspective when they use simple, standardised units of biodiversity, 
when there is a large offset trading volume, and when there are large 
geographical trading areas (Needham et al., 2019, in press). As a result, 
increasing the geographical flexibility (e.g. Needham et al., 2019) and 
ecological flexibility (e.g. Habib et al., 2013; Minerals Council of 
Australia, 2018) of offsets have been proposed as ways of improving the 
functioning of these market-like mechanisms. The rationale behind this 
is that flexibility widens the number of offsets that are eligible to 
compensate for a given biodiversity impact, as the impacted biodiversity 
feature can be traded for a wider set of potential biodiversity features. 
Therefore, the supply of potential offsets increases, which reduces prices 
because competition between landholders to secure a buyer for their 
offsets increases (although real-world heterogeneity in biodiversity 
values across jurisdictions may deliver the odd exception, e.g. Needham 
et al., in press). Some regulators may also favour flexibility, as it in-
creases the number of eligible offsets sites and therefore may reduce 
their administrative burden and costs. 
There have been various empirical explorations of the potential 
ecological benefits of offsetting flexibility. Bull et al. (2015) and Habib 
et al. (2013) have explored the potential biodiversity gains from 
scrapping the ‘ecological equivalence’ aspect of offset trades, high-
lighting that constraining trades to a certain biodiversity feature such as 
a habitat type might deliver sub-optimal biodiversity outcomes if that 
feature is common and not considered a local biodiversity priority, and 
higher priority alternatives are available. Geographical flexibility may 
also be essential in contexts where impacted biodiversity is highly mo-
bile or migratory, weakening the capacity of equivalent area-based 
offsets to sufficiently address biodiversity impacts (Bull et al., 2013b). 
In contexts where the aim is to offset historic habitat loss in highly 
modified landscapes retrospectively (i.e. after land use change has 
occurred and with no potential to influence the initial avoidance of 
impacts), flexibility can be necessary as there may be insufficient 
remaining appropriate offset sites. For example, Yu et al. (2018) 
describe an example from the Yellow River Delta in China where the 
only way that no net loss for each impacted wetland type could be 
achieved was through expanding the geographical scope of offsetting, 
allowing for offsetting in neighbouring regions. In some of the world’s 
most prominent offset systems in Australia (Box 1), calls for increasing 
the flexibility of offset trading certainly resonate with influential vested 
interests whose activities are being regulated through offsetting policy. 
For example, relaxing the ‘like-for-like’ requirements of offsetting pol-
icies is the stated preference of some key business stakeholders, such as 
representatives of extractive industries (Minerals Council of Australia, 
2018). 
Reflecting these issues, there is pressure from regulated industries 
and deregulation-friendly governments to implement policy changes to 
reduce transaction costs and stimulate offset supply (Apostolopoulou 
and Adams, 2017; Lave et al., 2010), with environmental regulation 
perceived as a barrier to development. Pressure from regulated stake-
holders to prioritise economic over ecological objectives is to be ex-
pected since biodiversity offsetting creates a regulatory framework 
Box 1 
Examples of Increasing flexibility in Australian state biodiversity offsetting systems 
In Australia, biodiversity offsetting has emerged as a key tool in the policy mix aiming to reduce rapid rates of deforestation and biodiversity loss 
across the continent (Bradshaw, 2012; Kearney et al., 2019; Miller et al., 2015). Australia has lost one third of all its native vegetation since 
European settlement, and 61% of all 1136 nationally-listed threatened species are threatened by habitat loss (Kearney et al., 2019; Ward et al., 
2019). Partially in response, most states have biodiversity offsetting policies, with the two most well established in the states of New South Wales 
and Victoria. 
The first offsetting system in New South Wales (BioBanking; first offset trades in 2010) specified like-for-like trading requirements for both 
ecosystem types and threatened species (Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water, 2010). Since the introduction of the Biodi-
versity Conservation Act in 2017, a new level of flexibility has been incorporated into the state’s approach to offsetting. Developers now have the 
choice of passing on their offset liability by paying into the Biodiversity Conservation Trust, a government-run fund. Although a hierarchy of 
preferred offsetting options is specified (i.e. preference is given to like-for-like or better in the same bioregion) there are no legal restrictions on 
the Trust offsetting using any habitat types anywhere in the state. As such, the option is open for both ecologically- and geographically-flexible 
offsetting. 
In Victoria, there is also evidence of a trend (albeit less severe) towards flexibility from the original 2002 Native Vegetation Framework 
(Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2002) to today’s native vegetation removal regulations. Notably, the policy goal was weakened 
from ‘net gain’ to ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity (Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, 2017a; Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, 2002). Initially, offset legislation incorporated a graded response, whereby strict like-for-like trades were required for vegetation 
of ‘Very High’ conservation significance and progressively weaker rules were allowed for vegetation as conservation significance decreased 
(Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2002). Since 2013 for general offsets (offsets for impacts to native vegetation where there are 
no threatened species present), there are no like-for-like restrictions. Offsets are required to have at least 80% of the ‘strategic biodiversity score’ 
of impact sites, which is a score derived from a systematic conservation prioritisation approach broadly representing habitat condition and rarity 
as well as the number of threatened species present (Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, 2017b). General offsets do have a 
geographical restriction, and are constrained to the same Catchment Management Authority or municipal district. For offsets to threatened 
species, there is a ‘like-for-like’ requirement, but no geographical restrictions on where those offsets are located throughout the state.  
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through which the biodiversity impacts of new developments are 
internalised and accounted for within the development process. This 
imposes a cost that regulated industries were previously able to exter-
nalise onto society as a whole. 
In several Australian offset systems, there is evidence that states are 
under pressure to increase offsetting flexibility (Ives and Bekessy, 2015; 
Nature Conservation Council of NSW, 2016). For example, Queensland 
recently reviewed their native vegetation offsetting policy and 
emphasised the ambition to reduce ‘green tape’ (Queensland Govern-
ment, 2019a, p11), with the justification that ‘some proponents have 
experienced difficulty addressing impacts for environmental values 
which cannot be offset’. Victoria’s most recent review highlighted the 
need to ‘support the development of the market for low availability 
offsets’ (Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, 2016), 
and a major motivation behind New South Wales’s biodiversity legis-
lation reform was to ‘provide greater levels of flexibility to industry and 
landholders on how they manage biodiversity, including native vege-
tation’ (Byron et al., 2014). These shifts aim to increase the supply of 
offset credits (thereby theoretically reducing prices). Consequently, 
numerous policy statements and modifications have occurred which 
increase offsetting flexibility (Box 1). 
There are two major underexplored and unquantified risks of 
increased flexibility that threaten to undermine the desired NNL out-
comes of offsetting market-like mechanisms. The first risk associated 
with increasing the ecological flexibility of offsetting (i.e. relaxing like- 
for-like) – especially in response to low supply – is the risk of interfering 
with information regarding the genuine scarcity of the impacted biodi-
versity feature, potentially disincentivising impact avoidance. The sec-
ond risk, associated with increasing geographical flexibility, is that 
larger trading areas have the potential to deliver offsets with lower 
additionality, undermining the conservation outcomes associated with 
the offsets. 
3. Flexibility interferes with information about biodiversity 
feature scarcity and disincentivises avoidance 
Under best practice, biodiversity offsets must be implemented as an 
option of last resort, preceded by the implementation of the first three 
steps of the mitigation hierarchy (avoidance, minimisation, remedia-
tion). In many cases biodiversity offset systems trade uncertain future 
biodiversity gains for imminent losses (Maron et al., 2012; Weissgerber 
et al., 2019). This lack of certainty that the intended biodiversity gains 
will be delivered in reality means avoiding impacts – step 1 of the 
mitigation hierarchy – is crucial (Buschke and Brownlie, 2020; Hough 
and Robertson, 2009; Phalan et al., 2018 but see Bull and Milner- 
Gulland, 2020). Note here that there is a distinction between avoid-
ance (i.e. avoiding impacts to biodiversity initially, first step of the 
mitigation hierarchy) and ‘avoided loss’ offsets, which are offsets that 
prevent biodiversity losses in an area that likely would have occurred 
without the offset. Under best practice principles, avoidance should be 
rigorously applied as the first step of the hierarchy, meaning that 
promises of compensation should not influence the requirement for 
adequate avoidance. However in practice, in some offset systems, 
despite the rhetoric of avoidance, offsetting appears to be the default 
response to biodiversity impacts (Clare and Krogman, 2013; Martin 
et al., 2016; Samuel, 2020). As a result, there is in reality a significant 
interaction between the offsetting and avoidance steps: a high degree of 
difficulty, and in particular a high price, associated with acquiring 
appropriate offsets will incentivise avoiding impacts in the first place 
(Koh et al., 2017; Pascoe et al., 2019). In this way, offsets represent a 
punitive-tax-like incentive to avoid causing biodiversity loss initially. 
The major risk therefore with increasing ecological flexibility is that 
it interferes with communicating the scarcity of the impacted biodi-
versity feature, thereby potentially disincentivising avoidance of im-
pacts to threatened biodiversity features. Offset requirements are often 
triggered specifically because the biodiversity feature impacted is 
threatened and/or scarce. If a threatened or scarce biodiversity feature is 
required to be compensated by the same biodiversity feature, then it is 
likely to be difficult or impossible to acquire an appropriate offset 
(because by definition, appropriate offsets are scarce), therefore incen-
tivising avoiding impacts to that biodiversity in the first instance (Koh 
et al., 2017). Under conventional economic theory (critically explored in 
Spash, 2015), we might expect that the scarcity of the impacted biodi-
versity feature would be communicated via a higher price for appro-
priate offsets, although evidence from offsetting markets in the US 
suggests that offset prices do not always predictably follow changes in 
supply and demand (Robertson, 2008, 2007). Nevertheless, the diffi-
culty of acquiring an appropriate offset provides essential biodiversity 
supply information – as such, it is an essential feature of biodiversity 
offset regulatory markets aiming to achieve NNL outcomes, not an 
economic inconvenience to be regulated away by increasing the supply 
of eligible offsets through increased flexibility of trades. 
Opening the door to increased flexibility can have very real conse-
quences for threatened biodiversity (Fig. 1). For example, in Australian 
biodiversity offsetting systems there are rarely restrictions that abso-
lutely prohibit impacts on particular biodiversity features, with off-
setting usually permitted if a compliant offset can be secured (e.g. 
Queensland permits the clearance of vegetation in national parks in 
return for offsetting with a multiplier of 10 (Queensland Government, 
2019b)). As a further example, under Western Sydney Growth Centre’s 
biodiversity offset program, flexibility has been built into the offset re-
quirements. The Growth Centre (which includes plans to construct 
200,000 new homes) impacts on several critically-endangered ecolog-
ical communities, including Cumberland Plain woodland and Shale 
Sandstone transition forest. Since the inception of the Growth Centre in 
2007, over 300 ha of these two communities have been converted to 
other land uses (Government of New South Wales, 2018). Whilst the 
scheme has so far achieved its (like-for-like) offsetting ‘requirements’, 
the Growth Centre was permitted to proceed with a commitment to 
avoided loss offsets using a multiplier of 1 (Government of New South 
Wales, 2006, p.6), which is well below a level sufficient to achieve NNL 
(Laitila et al., 2014). In effect, this equates to committing to a halving of 
remaining ecosystems. Regardless, in the event that there is ‘insufficient 
available land’ (p.13) for offsetting these threatened habitats, the inbuilt 
flexibility permits the program to offset using any grassy woodlands 
within the ecoregion, or indeed any other potential native vegetation. In 
short: flexibility circumvents the market incentive to avoid impacts to 
valuable habitats. Indeed, it may well permit considerable losses of these 
critically endangered habitats. If flexibility were not permitted, the 
scheme would have to avoid impacts to these ecosystems initially. This 
may come at some financial cost, but ultimately the policy goal is to 
achieve NNL of biodiversity and in this case flexible offsets do not 
facilitate this outcome. Of course, the loss of natural habitats also comes 
at considerable economic cost which is largely unaccounted for in offset 
pricing (including both market values such as the traded value of the 
price of carbon stored within natural habitats, and non-market values 
such as biodiversity’s existence value, and underpinning the resilience 
of delivery of other ecosystem services). The example from the Western 
Sydney Growth Centre is not a unique case – similar dynamics have been 
found for offsetting under Australia’s national environmental law, the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC 
Act). Instead of disincentivising impacts to biodiversity initially, the 
inability of proponents to satisfy the ‘like-for-like’ requirements of the 
EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy has led to instances of flexibility 
in offset conditions, and an expansion of indirect (e.g. ‘out-of-kind’) 
offsetting. Such offsets do not result in a conservation gain for the 
affected biodiversity, thereby implicitly facilitating the loss of valuable 
biodiversity (Australian National Audit Office, 2020). 
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More flexible offset trades – large trading 
area and no strict like-for-like
Less flexible offset trades  – local trading 
area and strict like-for-like
Legend
Planned development (e.g. housing 
developments in W Sydney growth centre)
Common vegetaon type
Scarce vegetaon type (e.g. Cumberland Plain woodland)
Developed area
High risk of clearing (Type 1 impact) and other degradaon 
(Type 2 impact)
Planned / implemented development
Avoided biodiversity loss
Potenally addional offset (whether truly addional 
depends on mulple context-specific factors not explored in 
this schemac)
‘Unaddional’ offset
Trading area / administrave boundary
A B
C
• Planned development affecng Cumberland Plain 
woodland located near the development froner
• Cumberland Plain woodland converted for 
development, offset by alternave habitat type
• Geographical flexibility means impact can be 
compensated for using habitat far from the 
development froner (i.e. where there is limited 
addionality from protecon)
• Fails to achieve NNL and facilitates decline of 
Cumberland Plain woodland
• As no appropriate offsets available in the 
geographical region, impacts to Cumberland 
Plain woodland must be avoided
• Impact compensated for in the same jurisdicon 
as the development froner, so more likely to be 
addional
• Higher costs incurred, but this reflects that 
threatened habitat is scarce and impacts are not 
consistent with conservaon aims
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the potential biodiversity outcomes associated with flexible, and inflexible offset trading using an illustrative case study (offsetting 
impacts to Cumberland Plain woodland under the Western Sydney Growth Centre offsetting policy). A) A development is planned, proposing to clear two units of 
Cumberland Plain woodland. B) Under more flexible trading rules, a different habitat type is permitted to offset impacts to the threatened habitat type, and the offset 
is located far from the development frontier. This means the incentive to avoid impacts to the threatened habitat initially has been undermined. Also, as the offset is 
located far from threats, the offset is likely to offer less additionality. C) Under less flexible trading rules, offsetting impacts to Cumberland Plain woodland has 
become challenging or expensive, as available offset sites are scarce. This incentivises developers to change their development plan to avoid some impacts to the 
threatened habitat initially. One unit of Cumberland Plain woodland is lost for development, and compensated for with an offset, and another unit of loss is avoided 
entirely. Whilst this schematic is used here to demonstrate the ecological benefits of rigid trading rules, in the real world the effectiveness of this offset at achieving 
NNL is dependent on other complexities not explored here. These complexities include the actual offset ratio used for the avoided loss offsets (1:1 as demonstrated 
here is far too low to achieve anywhere close to absolute NNL in reality); and the degree to which offsets are preventing Type 1 versus Type 2 impacts. 
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4. Expanding geographical trading areas may undermine 
additionality for avoided loss offsets 
A second argument for promoting strict trading rules that applies 
specifically to avoided loss offsets is that offsets within smaller 
geographic trading regions may yield greater conservation additionality 
than larger areas (Giannichi et al., 2020). Additionality is a key concept 
in biodiversity offsetting: for an offset to truly achieve NNL, it must 
achieve a conservation gain that would not have happened in the 
absence of the activities associated with the offset (Gordon et al., 2011; 
Maron et al., 2013; McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010). All things being 
equal, large trading regions are likely to contain a larger number of 
potential offset sites which are under limited or no threat of develop-
ment (Giannichi et al., 2020). The problem with increasing geographical 
trading areas in the name of improving functioning of the market-like 
mechanism in theory is that areas under low development pressure 
tend to ‘soak up’ the offset obligations of areas with high rates of 
development because of the lower economic opportunity costs of offset 
establishment (Ibid; Fig. 1). Areas with low development pressure are 
those that are least likely to be under threat. As a result, offsets located in 
these areas will offer the least additionality (conservation management 
will deliver a smaller conservation benefit relative to the counterfactual 
of what would have occurred without the offset). Similar patterns have 
been demonstrated to undermine the effectiveness of protected areas 
(Geldmann et al., 2019; Venter et al., 2018). Relaxing the geographical 
restrictions on offsets may tend to draw offsets away from areas where 
they would be more likely to be additional, and drive them towards 
areas where they offer limited gains relative to the counterfactual, thus 
undermining NNL outcomes. As a separate issue, smaller trading regions 
may also be socially desirable because of the potential inequity of 
reducing affected peoples’ access to nature by relocating it further away 
(BenDor et al., 2007; but see Bateman and Zonneveld, 2019). 
This issue is compounded if policies do not have robust methods for 
assessing offset additionality (Maseyk et al., 2020). In some avoided loss 
offsetting policies, including Australian native vegetation offsetting 
systems, the way additionality is operationalised is that sites which are 
not under formal legal protection are implicitly assumed to be under 
threat of land clearing or ecological degradation, regardless of their 
location or threat level (Maron et al., 2015). Hence, the policies assume 
that simply giving an unprotected site legal protection through an off-
setting agreement achieves an outcome that is additional (e.g. in Vic-
toria, this is referred to as ‘security gain’ (Department of Environment, 
Land, Water and Planning, 2017c)). However, working out whether an 
offset is truly additional requires an analysis of future threats (and 
probabilities of ecosystem degradation) to the site under the offsetting 
and counterfactual scenarios, which is rarely done in practice. Protec-
tion may well not deliver additional gains in some contexts (Sonter et al., 
2020). For example, if a patch of native vegetation that is not under 
formal protection is still standing after decades of land management, it is 
likely that that patch is under limited threat (i.e. because either clearing 
is uneconomic for landholders, or because the landowners hold pro- 
environmental attitudes and would likely have maintained that land 
even in the absence of formal protection (Selinske et al., 2016)). Other 
ways that additionality is commonly operationalised include using offset 
multipliers or assuming that offset management will improve the future 
biodiversity value of a site, but neither of these guarantee additional 
outcomes (Bull et al., 2017; Dorrough et al., 2019). Further, offsets can 
only deliver gains due to avoided losses if they protect habitat that is 
itself not subject to a mandatory offset requirement following clearance 
(see discussion in Maron et al. (2018) and Maseyk et al. (2020); Fig. 1). 
Type 1 impacts are impacts that would themselves trigger their own 
offset requirement (e.g. clearance of native vegetation for a new 
development), and Type 2 impacts are those that would not trigger their 
own offset (e.g. offsets that prevent a threatening process that is not 
subject to an offset, such as livestock grazing in areas of native vegeta-
tion). In reality, avoided loss offsets preventing Type 1 impacts offer no 
additionality, because they prevent the clearing of something that would 
trigger its own offset requirement if cleared. Only avoided loss offsets 
preventing Type 2 impacts can offer any true additionality. However, 
avoided loss offsetting systems in operation today in general fail to ac-
count for this subtlety, and this remains a fundamental flaw in the way 
gains due to avoided losses are calculated, undermining the ability of 
avoided loss offsets to achieve no net loss of biodiversity. 
Whilst the risk of geographical flexibility undermining additionality 
applies primarily to offsetting policy frameworks that permit the pres-
ervation or enhancement of existing habitats as offsets, this is non-trivial 
– avoided loss offsets represent approximately 20% of all of the world’s 
recorded biodiversity offsets by number, covering approximately 
50,000km2 (Bull and Strange, 2018). Systems based purely on restora-
tion or habitat creation, such as those in the US and Germany, are less 
likely to suffer from these drawbacks as additionality is implicit in the 
act of habitat creation (assuming that habitat would not have passively 
regenerated under the do-nothing counterfactual; but see Sonter et al. 
(2017)). This risk would be reduced for offsets which calculate the 
additionality on a case-by-case basis and integrate this into the calcu-
lation of the appropriate offset multiplier (e.g. some large voluntary 
offsets summarised in Maseyk et al. (2020)). 
5. Improving regulatory market function without inducing the 
risks of flexibility 
As discussed above, flexible trading rules are perceived as solutions 
to issues relating to ‘thin markets’ (characterised by low offset supply), 
including price volatility, strategic behaviour, and market collapse 
(Adjemian et al., 2016; Needham et al., 2019). However, we contend 
that there are other mechanisms that can be used to improve the func-
tion of offset regulatory markets without introducing offset flexibility 
that risks undermining biodiversity outcomes. The key point is that the 
difficulty of securing an appropriate offset trade is a function of two 
properties: a) the availability of appropriate offset sites containing the 
impacted habitat type (itself influenced by the absolute scarcity of the 
threatened habitat type); and b) transaction costs associated with the 
process of offsetting. The aim of actions to improve the functioning of 
the market-like mechanism should ideally be to reduce transaction costs, 
whilst leaving the information about the scarcity of the biodiversity 
feature intact. Some of the key determinants of transaction costs include 
a lack of landholder awareness about offset policies, regulatory uncer-
tainty (the regulations surrounding offset policies tend to change 
frequently), and the degree of trust landholders have in offset admin-
istrators (Coggan et al., 2013). These factors can be improved without 
changing offset trading rules through increasing investments in educa-
tion and communication about the programme, engagement with pre-
viously unreached landholders, and introducing policy stability by 
committing to keeping the regulation unchanged for a set period of time. 
We acknowledge these are challenging, but it should not be the default 
option to increase flexibility and risk the policy’s ecological outcomes 
just because alternative mechanisms for improving market function are 
difficult to achieve. Additionally, an important driver of price volatility 
and strategic behaviour between buyers or sellers in thin markets is 
asymmetrical information (Adjemian et al., 2016), which occurs when 
one party has better information about the market or the good/service 
being transacted than the other party. For example, the offset seller is 
likely to have a better understanding of their true opportunity costs than 
the buyer, which may permit them to charge higher prices than the seller 
would in reality be willing to accept. This can be addressed through 
better public offset registries and data on offset transactions, such as the 
public offset registries implemented by Western Australia or France 
(Government of France, 2020; Government of Western Australia, 2020). 
All of these actions could be implemented without interfering with the 
information about the scarcity of the biodiversity feature. 
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6. When flexibility is justifiable 
From a biodiversity perspective, we would argue that flexibility is 
rarely justifiable once real-world implementation issues are taken into 
account. Institutional factors that influence when flexibility is justifiable 
include when: a) the offsetting market-like mechanism is embedded 
within a planning system that includes strict avoidance of threatened 
biodiversity features; or b) regulatory institutions have the capacity and 
resources to implement strategic offsetting actions whose biodiversity 
benefits unquestionably exceed those of like-for-like trading rules. In 
planning systems with strict avoidance, if implemented effectively, 
flexibility cannot be used for legitimising losses to threatened biodi-
versity. For example, the proposed Net Gain policy in England is explicit 
that offsetting under Net Gain will not weaken existing protections for 
biodiversity, or be used to justify impacts to irreplaceable habitat (Defra, 
2019). This protection is imperfect, and harm to irreplaceable biodi-
versity can still occur if it is considered to be in the overriding public 
interest for political or economic reasons. However, in these contexts a 
bespoke compensation package is agreed and it does not occur within 
the framework of the offsetting policy. The argument for flexibility being 
more justifiable where regulators have high levels of capacity is that 
centralised bodies may able to implement a more systematic and well- 
planned approach to offsetting that targets local biodiversity priorities 
than case-by-case offsetting (Habib et al., 2013). However, so far 
implementation of these approaches has been limited (for example, as of 
February 2019, of the AUD$9.6 million paid into Queensland’s offset 
fund at the time, only AUD$1.5 million had been committed or spent on 
offsets (Queensland Government, 2019a)). Until such systems are 
demonstrably effective, we suggest that this this approach to enabling 
increased flexibility through a centralised body will undermine impact 
avoidance and conservation outcomes (Fig. 2). 
It is especially important that conservationists are alert to when 
flexibility is being advocated for purely because appropriate offsets are 
expensive: indeed, if offsets for a specific biodiversity feature are 
expensive, this may well be an indication that the biodiversity feature is 
scarce or threatened and so flexibility might not be justified for that 
feature. In these cases, the worst outcome from a biodiversity 
perspective is that regulators deprioritise offsetting exactly because it is 
expensive – a situation aptly demonstrated by the Warragamba Dam 
proposal in New South Wales, where a state-owned utility company 
attempted to reclassify impacts to critically-endangered species habitats 
as ‘indirect impacts’ in order to avoid their high offset costs (Hannam, 
2020; Sanda, 2020). Deprioritising offsetting when expensive gravely 
undermines the economic logic for having offsetting systems in the first 
place. 
7. Getting the ‘right’ level of flexibility 
The major difficulty in setting the ‘optimal’ degree of flexibility that 
should be permitted in an offsetting system is that ultimately the out-
comes of flexibility are mediated by an unobservable characteristic, 
which is the intention or motivation behind the actor advocating flexi-
bility. Simplistically, the ideal policy from a biodiversity perspective 
(which is the stated purpose of NNL policies) would allow flexibility 
when it helps with the achievement of the specific policy goal (i.e. is 
motivated by achieving NNL or net gain in biodiversity), and restrict it 
when motivated by other factors which undermine the likelihood of 
achieving the policy goal, such as simple cost minimisation. In practice, 
this information is challenging to discern, and so regulators rely on 
heuristics such as ‘like-for-like or better’ trading rules, with each policy 
determining the classifications for what types of biodiversity count as 
like-for-like (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010). Although ‘like-for-like or 
better’ trading rules are widely accepted, it is worth reflecting that, 
supposedly in the name of NNL, many of these rules permit the loss of 
threatened biodiversity as long as it is replaced with other types of 
threatened biodiversity. Such a premise has recently been questioned 
under the newly-proposed ‘target-based ecological compensation’ 
framework (Simmonds et al., 2020), where it has been suggested that 
‘drawing down’ on existing biodiversity should only be permitted if that 
biodiversity feature is above its ‘target level’ (i.e. for a species, an 
appropriate target might be not being classed as threatened on the IUCN 
Red List; for a habitat type, it might be a target percentage of the his-
torical habitat extent remaining). Similar principles might be used to 
determine when flexibility is considered acceptable, with the exact 
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Fig. 2. Summary of the advantages and disadvantages of changing the flexibility of offset trades, the mechanisms through which outcomes are achieved, and the 
factors that those outcomes are dependent on. The top half denotes ecological outcomes, and the bottom half denotes economic and political outcomes. 
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threshold tailored to the local policy aim and context. 
8. Implications for existing and emerging offsetting systems 
The main implication is that regulators setting the trading rules of 
offset policies need to be aware that there are multiple mechanisms for 
dealing with problems associated with thin markets, each associated 
with drawbacks and advantages. Although offset policies are in practice 
always imperfect because they are trying to satisfy multiple objectives (i. 
e. ecological, economic, political), some changes which are intended to 
satisfy non-biodiversity objectives can fundamentally undermine the 
core biodiversity objectives. Additionally, they can somewhat under-
mine the theoretical strengths of even applying market-like mechanisms 
to biodiversity management issues in the first place. Changing the level 
of flexibility inevitably generates winners and losers, and it is always 
worth questioning who they are and why their interests are being pri-
oritised or deprioritised. In general, we contend that increasing flexi-
bility tends to increase satisfaction of economic objectives and favour 
the interests of offset procurers (e.g. developers). Given the current 
generally low capacity of offset system regulators, this often detracts 
from the ecological objectives of the policy. 
In the case of Australian offsetting systems, we would suggest that 
policymakers need to consider whether overall biodiversity outcomes 
(the sum of biodiversity impacts avoided - as step one of the mitigation 
hierarchy - and those successfully offset) are more likely to achieve NNL 
objectives under flexible or strict trading policies. We would argue that, 
as it stands, no net loss is more likely to be achieved under strict policies. 
There are also important lessons for all of the world’s many emerging 
offsetting and biodiversity compensation systems (zu Ermgassen et al., 
2019a), as decisions on trading rules embedded at the outset have an 
overwhelming influence on their biodiversity impacts (Calvet et al., 
2015). There are less significant implications for North American off-
setting systems, both because the policies already freely allow trades 
between different types of wetlands (i.e. they are highly ecologically 
flexible), and because they are primarily restoration-based programs, so 
it is usually easier to ensure that offsets are truly additional. 
9. Conclusion 
The case has previously been made for increasing the flexibility of 
biodiversity offset trades (Habib et al., 2013), however, here we argue 
that restricting the flexibility of trades has some highly desirable prop-
erties. Most importantly, in offsetting systems where impact avoidance 
is imperfect and is influenced by the difficulty of securing offsets, like- 
for-like offsetting drives the unobservable process of impact avoidance 
(Pascoe et al., 2019), whereby threatened aspects of biodiversity remain 
unimpacted because insufficient offsets are available. This process has 
been largely unaddressed in the offsetting literature (Phalan et al., 
2018), even though avoidance is widely considered the most important 
aspect of the mitigation hierarchy (Hough and Robertson, 2009; zu 
Ermgassen et al., 2019a). Geographical trading restrictions also have the 
potential to enhance the additionality of offsets, which is a fundamen-
tally important property that defines their associated biodiversity out-
comes (Gordon et al., 2011; Maron et al., 2013). To ensure biodiversity 
offsetting market-like mechanisms are fit to tackle ongoing biodiversity 
declines we encourage policymakers and practitioners involved in 
existing offsetting systems and emerging systems around the world to 
prioritise the biodiversity objectives of these policies. Ultimately, this 
requires clear thinking about whether increasing flexibility helps to 
achieve these policies’ fundamental biodiversity goals, or hinders them. 
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Calvet, C., Napoléone, C., Salles, J.-M., 2015. The biodiversity offsetting dilemma: 
between economic rationales and ecological dynamics. Sustainability 7, 7357–7378. 
Cheung, S.N., 2016. Economic organization and transaction costs. New Palgrave Dict. 
Econ. 1–5. 
Clare, S., Krogman, N., 2013. Bureaucratic slippage and environmental offset policies: 
the case of wetland management in Alberta. Soc. Nat. Resour. 26, 672–687. 
Coggan, A., Buitelaar, E., Whitten, S., Bennett, J., 2013. Factors that influence 
transaction costs in development offsets: who bears what and why? Ecol. Econ. 88, 
222–231. 
Crosher, I., Gold, S., Heaver, M., Heydon, M., Moore, L., Panks, S., Scott, S., Stone, D., 
White, N., 2019. The biodiversity metric 2.0: auditing and accounting for 
biodiversity value. User guide (Beta version, July 2019). Natural England. 
Defra, 2019. Net Gain: Summary of Responses and Government Response. Department 
for Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs.  
Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water, 2010. Draft BioBanking 
Assessment Methodology (Version 2) (New South Wales).  
Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, 2016. Outcomes Report: Review 
of the Native Vegetation Clearing Regulations (Victoria).  
S.O.S.E. zu Ermgassen et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Biological Conservation 252 (2020) 108861
9
Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, 2017a. Guidelines for the 
Removal, Destruction or Lopping of Native Vegetation (Victoria).  
Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, 2017b. Biodiversity Information 
Explanatory Document: Measuring Value when Removing or Offsetting Native 
Vegetation (Victoria).  
Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, 2017c. Native vegetation gain 
scoring manual. 
Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2002. Victoria’s Native Vegetation 
Management: A Framework for Action. Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, Victoria.  
Dorrough, J., Sinclair, S.J., Oliver, I., 2019. Expert predictions of changes in vegetation 
condition reveal perceived risks in biodiversity offsetting. PLoS One 14, e0216703. 
Evans, M.C., 2017. Opportunities and Risks in the Implementation of Biodiversity Offset 
Policy in Australia, in: Public Policy for Biodiversity Conservation: Evaluating 
Outcomes, Opportunities and Risks. Australian National University, Canberra.  
Gardner, T.A., HASE, A., Brownlie, S., Ekstrom, J.M., Pilgrim, J.D., Savy, C.E., 
Stephens, R.T., Treweek, J., Ussher, G.T., Ward, G., 2013. Biodiversity offsets and 
the challenge of achieving no net loss. Conserv. Biol. 27, 1254–1264. 
Geldmann, J., Manica, A., Burgess, N.D., Coad, L., Balmford, A., 2019. A global-level 
assessment of the effectiveness of protected areas at resisting anthropogenic 
pressures. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 116, 23209–23215. 
Giannichi, M.L., Gavish, Y., Baker, T.R., Dallimer, M., Ziv, G., 2020. Scale dependency of 
conservation outcomes in a forest-offsetting scheme. Conserv. Biol. 34, 148–157. 
Gibbons, P., Macintosh, A., Constable, A.L., Hayashi, K., 2018. Outcomes from 10 years 
of biodiversity offsetting. Glob. Chang. Biol. 24, e643–e654. 
Gordon, A., Langford, W.T., Todd, J.A., White, M.D., Mullerworth, D.W., Bekessy, S.A., 
2011. Assessing the impacts of biodiversity offset policies. Environ. Model. Softw. 
26, 1481–1488. 
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